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Abstract
In this paper I will introduce a new political economy model,
where there exists a competition amongst two political candidates,
which aim to set a policy which enables them to win elections, max-
imising the probability of winning. I will show that, if taxes neces-
sary to repay the debt are not lump sum but proportional to income,
we have dramatic distorting e¤ect on the labour supply. The prob-
lems is exacerbate once we take into account that the Government
set taxes in order to favour the most inuencing social group. As a
consequence, e¤ective marginal tax rates are di¤erentiated amongst
social groups and thus the burden of public debt is not equally borne.
1 Introduction
In this paper I will introduce a new political economy model, where there exists
a competition amongst two political candidates, which aim to set a policy which
enables them to win elections, maximising the probability of winning. I will show
that, if taxes necessary to repay the debt are not lump sum but proportional to
income, we have dramatic distorting e¤ect on the labour supply. The problems
is exacerbate once we take into account that the Government set taxes in order
to favour the most inuencing social group. As a consequence, e¤ective marginal
tax rates are di¤erentiated amongst social groups and thus the burden of public
debt is not equally borne. Unlike Neoclassical Theory, in a political economy
framework an issue of debt has dramatic e¤ects on society welfare: rst of all it
distorts individual choices about the amount of labour so supply and this has
consequences both on consumption and on production. But most importantly,
the necessity to set taxes to repay the debt has redistribution e¤ects amongst
di¤erent groups, since the most powerful groups receive a tax benet from the
scal system, whilst the less powerful groups must borne the entire burden of
taxation. Summarizing, the issue of public debt has real economic consequences
both in terms of e¢ ciency and in terms of equity.
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2 Debt Issue and Ricardian Equivalence
The Ricardian Equivalence is one of the most debated theory in the history of
Economics. Originally proposed to be rejected by the 19-th century English
economist David Ricardo [40], the theory lived its peak of success under Robert
Barros works [4], [5]. It was Barro himself that in the paper of 1979 On the
Determination of the Public Debt described the Ricardian equivalence theorem
as
the proposition that shifts between debt and tax nance for a given
amount of public expenditure would have no rst-order e¤ect on
the real interest rate, volume of private investment, etc.
Secondly, in the famous paper of 1974 Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?
he wrote in his conclusions
The basic conclusion is that there is no persuasive theoretical case
for treating government debt, at the margin, as a net component
of perceived household wealth
and that
in the case where the marginal net-wealthe¤ect of government bonds
is close to zero (...) scal e¤ects involving changes in the relative
amounts of tax and debt nance for a given amount of public
expenditure would have no e¤ect on aggregate demand, interest
rates, and capital formation.
Especially this last conclusion was a negation of the Keynesian theory which
stated that scal policies are e¤ective according to the Keynesian multiplier
mechanism. Furthermore, Barros theory contraddicted the theory of the pub-
lic debt which was developing in the 70s by prominent economists such as
Buchanan, Modigliani and Diamond. Also economist who were working on a
theory of social security systems, such as Feldstein felt attached. In 1976 Feld-
stein replied to Barro demonstrating that, even in the presence of an economy
characterized by the existence of bequests, government debt reduces private sav-
ings and the equilibrium rate of caital to labour if, unlike Barros assumptions,
the economy has not a constant population and the growth of rate is di¤erent
from zero. Under the condition that the rate of interest on public debt is lower
than the growth of rate Feldstein argued that the rst generation will not in-
crease the amount of bequest, knowing that no future generation must borne
the burdent of the debt. But, what if the rate of interest on public debt exceeds
the rate of growth of the economy? Even in this case, if the di¤erence between
the two greatnesses is small, Feldstein demonstrated that the rst generation
increases its bequest by less than the value of the debt. Another source of cri-
tique came from Buchanan [8] who accused Barro to have misread Ricardos
original statement and even though he was himself accused by ODriscoll [?]
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not to have understood that the actual Ricardos position was against rather
than pro-Ricardian equivalence. At the beginning of the 80s rst econometric
studies to discover whether the Ricardian Equivalence held was conducted by
Feldstein [18] who concluded that changes in government spending or taxes can
have substantial e¤ects on aggregate demand, denying the equivalence. Oth-
erwise, the monetarist theory spoused the Ricardian Equivalence; in 1984 Mc-
Callum [31] validated the monetarist hypothesis according to which a costant,
positive budget decit can be mantained permanently and without ination, if
it nanced by government bonds rather than taxation. Nevertheless, as him-
self recognized, uncertainty, distribution e¤ects and multiple interest rates are
ignored by Barros theory but that this did not represent a problem since the
same is true of most policy-oriented theoretical analyses of macroeconomic phe-
nomena , then there is no apparent reason why the issue at hand requires
a di¤erent type of treatment and it would seem satisfactory to neglet them
there, as elsewhere . We will see later on that this reason not only exists but it
is foundamental to understand the e¤ect of public debt on the welfare of society.
Some years later Feldstein [19] demostrated that the Barros theory did not hold
even in the presence of non-negative bequests, just considering individuals who
are uncertain abouth their future incomes and, as a consequence, modify their
consumption path, raising consumption at present time following, for instance,
a tax cut. Hence, the reaction to a change in scal policies is non-neutral but
consumption modies according to the sign of the policy.
3 The basic model
I consider a four-period model with overlapping generations, where each gener-
ation lives only for two periods, the youth and old age. At any period of time,
the generation of youths coexists with the generation of the elderly. At the
beginning of the next period, the elderly die, the youths become elderly and a
new generation of youths is born. As a consequence, there are two overlapping
generations of people living at any one time. Generations are unlinked, meaning
that there is no possibility to leave any bequest. Individuals consume all the
available income earned at a given period of time; thus, it is not possible neither
to save nor to borrow money.
Then, at time t, let a population of size one be partitioned into two groups of
workers, the young, representing the generation born at time t and denoted by
 , and the old, representing the generation born at time t  1 and who denoted
by  1. I will use capital letters to indicate the group and small letters to
indicate single individuals belonging to a group. The size of a group does not
change over time.
Each worker has to decide how to divide his total amount of time t between
work and leisure (denoted by l). If the level of leisure reach 100%, I assume
that the worker retires and gets a benet equal to p 1t .
Furthermore, I introduce the core assumptions of the model. I assume that
the old and the young are identical in every respect except two: rst of all the
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intrinsic value of the old workers for leisure is assumed to be strictly greater
than the same value of the young workers. That is,   1 >>   , where Greek
letter psi denotes the intrinsic value for leisure. Thus, the two social groups
have di¤erent preferences with respect to the choice between work and leisure.
Secondly, the wage of the old is higher than the wage of the young. That is:
w 1 > w . The di¤erence in wages is due to the existence of a labour market
imperfection, according to which rms praise the older workers (insiders) and
penalizes the younger (outsiders). As a consequence, the old can be seen as the
richest member of society and the young the poorests. The wage rate does not
change over time.
This assumption is supported by the empirical evidence. For a review on
di¤erences in preferences for leisure, see Canegrati. For the evidence on the
di¤erences in wage rates amongst cohorts... (to be nished). Old workers
preferences can be represented by a quasi-linear utility function1 .
3.1 Timing of the game
The game takes place on time horizon which runs from time t 1 to time t+2. At
every period, elections between two candidates, say A and B, wish to maximize
their number of votes to win elections 2 . Both of them have an ideological label
(for instance they are seen as Democratsor Republicans ). I assume that
this label is exogenously given.
In the rst stage of the game, the two candidates, simultaneously and inde-
pendently, announce (and commit to) a policy vector,
 !
qA and
 !
qB .
In the second stage elections take place. A candidate wins elections if and
only if it obtains the majority of votes; in the case of a tie a coin is tossed
in order to choose the Government which will come to power. Furthermore, I
assume that each party prefers to stay out from the competition than to enter
and lose, that prefers to tie than stay out and it prefers to win than to tie.
Finally, in the third stage, workers choose their work and leisure, given the
level of credits chosen by the Government.
3.2 Utility functions and budget constraints
A representative worker of generation    2 at time t   1 has the following
lifetime utility function:
U 2 = c 2t 1 +  
 2 log l 2t 1 (1)
8    1 2 T   2
where c 2t 1 is consumption at time t   1, l 2t 1 is leisure at time t   1 and
  2 is a parameter representing the intrinsic preference of the worker for leisure 
  2 2 [0; 1].
1A quasi-linear utility function entails the non existence of the income e¤ect
2Lindbeck and Weibull 1987 and Dixit and Londregan 1996 demonstrated that the Nash
equilibrium obtained if candidates maximize their vote share is identical to that obtained
when candidates maximize their probability of winning
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The worker consumes all his income:
c 2t 1 = (w
 2(1  L) + a 2t 1 L)(t  l 2t 1 ) (2)
where w 2 is the unitary wage per hour worked, L is the tax rate on labour
income (equal for every group and constant over time) and a 2t 1 the tax credit.
Similarly, preferences of a representative worker of generation    1 at time
t  1 are given by the following lifetime utility function:
U 1 = c 1t 1 +  
 1 log l 1t 1 + (c
 1
t +  
 1 log l 1t ) (3)
8   1 2 T   1
where c 1t 1 and c
 1
t represent consumption at time t   1 and t, l 1t 1 and
l 1t leisure at time t 1 and t, and   1 is the intrinsic preference of the worker
for leisure
 
  1 2 [0; 1]. Since at time t 1 a worker of generation  1 knows
that at time t will be old, their utility function includes the leisure of the next
period, weighted by a discount factor  2 [0; 1].
The workers inter temporal budget constraint is given by:
c 1t 1 + c
 1
t = (w
 1
t 1 (1  L) + a 1t 1 L)(t  l 1t 1 )
+((w 1t (1  L) + a 1t L)(t  l 1t )  bt)) (4)
where bt represents the per capita public debt.
A representative worker of generation  at time t has the following utility
function:
U = ct +  
 log lt + (c

t+1 +  
 log lt+1) (5)
8 2 T under the budget constraint
ct + c

t+1 = (w

t (1  L) + at L)(t  lt   bt)
+((wt+1(1  L) + at+1L)(t  lt+1) + (1 + r)bt) (6)
where r represents the interest rate paid on public debt.
Finally, a representative worker of generation  + 1 at time t + 1 has the
following utility function:
U+1 = c+1t+1 +  
+1 log l+1t+1 + (c
+1
t+2 +  
+1 log l+1t+2 ) (7)
8 + 1 2 T + 1 under the budget constraint
c+1t+1 + c
+1
t+2 = (w
+1
t+1 (1  L) + a+1t+1 L)(t  l+1t+1 )
+((w+1t+2 (1  L) + a+1t+2 L)(t  l+1t+2 )) (8)
where r represents the interest rate paid on public debt.
5
3.3 The Government
The literature has used di¤erent formulations for the Governments objective
function. A typical normative approach considers a benevolent Government
which aims to maximize a Social Utility Function by choosing the optimal tax
rate on labour, subject to a budget constraint where public expenditures are
nanced either by current taxation or by public debt issue. For instance, Barro
[5] used a type of budget equation where, in each period, interest payments
during period t are assumed to apply to the stock of debt outstanding at the
beginning of the period (see equation 1 ). Furthermore, Barro consider an overall
budget constraint where present value of government expenditure (aside from
interest payments) added to the initial amount of debt is equated to the present
value of taxes over an innite horizon of time (see equation 2 ). Unfortunately,
the Barros idea about the existence of an innitely living Government which
chooses tax rates for every period solving an optimization problem seems to
be rather unrealistic and of course at odds with reality where, instead, usually
Governments are short-lived and remain in charge only for few years. Things
worsen once we consider that many times Governments are not benevolent but
are rent-seekers, utterly involved in the quest for election win. In such an
environment, it is clear that Barros theory may do not hold anymore. In
this paper, I will use a classical political economy model characterized by the
presence of a Probabilistic Voting Model with single-minded groups (see [?])
where politicians act in order to maximize the probability of being re-elected.
The policy vector the Government has to choose is given by:
~q = (a 2t 1 ; a
 1
t 1 ; a
 1
t ; a

t ; a

t+1; a
+1
t+1 )
encompassing tax credits at time t  1 just before the debt issue, tax credits at
time t when the debt is issued and tax credits at time t + 1 when the debt is
paid back. I will assume that from period t+ 2 on, tax credits turn back to be
the same as at t  1.
Hence, I introduce governments budget equations.
3.3.1 time t  1
n 2L(t  l 2t 1 )(w 2t 1   a 2t 1 ) + n 1L(t  l 1t 1 )(w 1t 1   a 1t 1 ) = 0 (9)
where n 2L(t  l 2t 1 )(w 2t 1  a 2t 1 ) represents total revenues generated by
the taxation of generation    2 at time t  1, whilst n 1L(t  l 1t 1 )(w 1t 1  
a 1t 1 ) the total revenues generated by the taxation of generation    1.
Since revenues are proportional to the amount of labour supplied, the tax-
ation entails ine¢ ciencies, since it distorts workersdecisions on the amount of
labour supplied. I also assume that a contingent budget surplus is entirely used
to pay pensions to the retirees.
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3.3.2 time t
At time t, the Government issues an amount of debt equal to Bt, seen as an
one-period, single-coupon bonds and issued at par allocated amongst all the
voters who get exactly the same amount debt, equal to bt. Hence, the new
governments budget equations is:
n 1L(t  l 1t )(w 1t   a 1t ) + nL(t  lt )(wt   at ) +Bt = 0 (10)
3.3.3 time t+ 1
At time t + 1 the Government pays an amount of real interest, rBt, and the
principal. Thus the governments budget equations may be written as:
nL(t  lt+1)(wt+1 at+1)+n+1L(t  l+1t+1 )(w+1t+1  a+1t+1 ) = (1+ r)Bt (11)
3.4 The equilibrium
I solve the game, starting from period t   1 where a representative worker of
generation    2 solves the following optimization problem:
maxU 2 = c 2t 1 +  
 2 log l 2t 1
s:t: c 2t 1 = ((1  L) + a 2t 1 L)(t  l 2t 1 )
Solving with respect to l 2t 1 I obtain an expression for the optimal amount of
leisure:
l 2t 1 =
  2
w 2((1  L) + a 2t 1 L)
(12)
and substituting into (1) I obtain an expression for the Indirect Utility Function:
V  2 = tw 2((1 L)+a 2t 1 L)   2+  2 log  2   2 log(w 2((1 L)+a 2t 1 L))
(13)
I do the same for the representative worker of generation    1:
max U 1 = c 1t 1 +  
 1 log l 1t 1 + (c
 1
t +  
 1 log l 1t )
s:t: c 1t 1+c
 1
t = ((1 L)+a 1t 1 L)(t l 1t 1 )+((t l 1t )((1 L)+a 1t L) bt)
l 1t 1 =
  1
w 1((1  L) + a 1t 1 L)
(14)
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l 1t =
  1
w 1((1  L) + a 1t L)
(15)
V  1 = tw 1((1 L)+a 1t 1 L)   1+  1 log  1   1 logw 1(((1 L)+a 1t 1 L))
+a 1t 1 L)+t((1 L)+a 1t L)+  1(log  1)   1 log(w 1((1 L)+a 1t L) bt)
(16)
The same for the representative worker of generation 
max U = ct +  
 log lt + (c

t+1 +  
 log lt+1)
s:t: ct+c

t+1 = ((1 L)+at L)(t lt ) bt+((t lt+1)((1 L)+at+1L)+rbt)
lt =
 
w ((1  L) + at L)
(17)
lt+1 =
 
w ((1  L) + at+1L)
(18)
V  = tw ((1  L) + at L)    +   log      logw (((1  L) + at L))
+at L) bt+t((1 L)+at+1L)+  (log  )   log(w ((1 L)+at+1L)+rbt) (19)
and for a representative worker of generation  + 1
max U+1 = c+1t+1 +  
+1 log l+1t+1 + (c
+1
t+2 +  
+1 log l+1t+2 )
s:t: c+1t +c
+1
t+2 = ((1 L)+a+1t+1 L)(t l+1t+1 )+((t l+1t+2 )((1 L)+a+1t+2 L)+rbt+1)
l+1t+1 =
 +1
w+1((1  L) + a+1t+1 L)
(20)
l+1t+2 =
 +1
w+1((1  L) + a+1t+2 L)
(21)
V  = tw+1((1 L)+a+1t+1 L)  +1+ +1 log +1  +1 logw+1(((1 L)+a+1t+1 L))
+a+1t+1 L)+t((1  L)+ a+1t+2 L)+ +1(log +1)  +1 log(w+1((1  L)+ a+1t+2 L)
(22)
In the second stage of the game elections take place. It is easy to verify that
the electionsoutcome is a tie. The proof arises as an obvious consequence of the
resolution of the rst stage, where it will be demonstrated that in equilibrium,
both parties choose an identical policy vector.
In the rst stage, the two candidates choose their policy vectors. They face
exactly the same optimization problem and maximize their share of votes or,
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equivalently, the probability of winning. The resolution is made for candidate
A, but it also holds for candidate B.
max A =
1
2
+
h
s
X
I=fT 1;Tg
nIsI [V i(~qA)  V i(~qB)]
n 1L(t  l 1t )(w 1t   a 1t ) + nL(t  lt )(wt   at ) = 0
I provide a complete resolution to the problem in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium both candidates policy vectors converge to the
same platform; that is ~qA = ~qB = ~q.
Proof : ~q represents the policy which captures the highest number of swing
voters. Instead, suppose there exists other two policies ~q0 and ~q00; in moving
from ~q to ~q0 (or ~q00) a candidate loses more swing voters than those it is able to
gain. Thus, suppose a starting point where candidate A chooses ~q0 and candidate
B chooses ~q00 such that in choosing ~q0 and ~q00 the elections outcome is a tie. If
one candidate moved toward ~q, it would be able to gain more swing voters
than those it loses and thus, it would win the elections. So, choosing any policy
but ~q cannot be an optimal answer. The only one policy which represents a
Nash Equilibrium is ~q since it is the intersection between the optimal answers
of the two candidates and no one candidate has an incentive to deviate. Since
each candidate maximizes its share of votes, in equilibrium the two candidates
receive both one half of votes; if one candidate should receive less than one half
of votes it would always have the possibility to adopt the platform chosen by
the other candidate and get the same number of votes. Notice that what we
found here is the multidimensional analogue of Hotellings principle of minimum
di¤erentiation.
Corollary 1 The utility levels reached by workers are the same; that is: V iA =
V iB.
Proposition 2 The marginal tax rate on labour is equal for both groups but the
tax credit is more benecial for the elder generation.
Proof : obtained via numerical simulations. See Tables 1-3 in Appendix 1.
Proposition 3 Optimal allowances are a function of the numerosity and den-
sity of both groups, of the marginal tax rate, of the total endowment of time
and of the parameters representing preferences of groups for leisure. That is:
aIt = a(s
I ; s I ; nI ; n I ; L; t;  I ;   I).
Proof : see Appendix 1.
Thus, the political economy framework suggests that e¤ective tax rates
should be di¤erentiated amongst cohorts, as Proposition 2 states. Indeed, if
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a traditional and normative approach suggests that a benevolent Governments
should tax less the poorest social groups, this political economy approach sug-
gests that in a real world vote-seeker Governments tax groups according to their
ability to threat politicians in the electoral competition.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, the amount of leisure for the older generation
is higher than the amount of leisure for the younger generation.
Proof : see Appendix 1.
Corollary 2 Tax revenues collected via labour taxation on the younger gen-
eration are positive; tax revenues generated via the labour taxation on labour
taxation on the older generation are negative.
Proof : It derives from Proposition 2 and 4.
Thus, the scal system described by the model, is compatible with the de-
cision of the old to early retire. As a consequence, revenues collected from the
taxation of the old are equal to zero, whilst revenues collected with the taxa-
tion of the young are positive and equal to the amount of pensions that the old
receive. The fact that tax revenues are negative for the old and positive for the
young means that the old get a transfer nanced with revenues of the young.
Corollary 3 The old are more single-minded than the young. That is: (s 1 >
s ).
Proof : The result derives from the assumption that the density function is
monotonically increasing in leisure (s = s(l)). Since the old obtain more leisure
in equilibrium, the density is higher and, by denition, the group is more single-
minded.
Finally, the Lagrange multiplier has a political meaning: it represents the
increase in the probability of winning for a candidate, if it had an additional
dollar available to spend on redistribution.
4 Numerical Simulations
Numerical simulations was made since an analytical solution for the system is
hard to compute. Indeed, to get the optimal policy vector we have to solve
several systems of three equations with three unknowns (the two tax credits
and the Lagrange multiplier). Nevertheless, also this process su¤ers from some
problems. First of all, the simultaneity. We have assumed that the density
function is endogenous in leisure; this implies that we are able to know the
value of the density only after having calculated the optimal level of leisure
which depends on the level of taxation but which is exactly what we want to
evaluate! A possible way out for this problem is to guess a numerical value for
the density function and verify afterwords that the level of leisure calculated
is compatible with the initial guess; in other words, if we assume that the
density is monotonically increasing in leisure, we should expect to nd higher
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levels of leisure for the group of the old for which we have guessed an higher
density. Should not this happen, it would mean that our guess is wrong and the
SMT fails. Furthermore, we also know that in equilibrium optimal leisure is an
incrasing function of  . As a consequence, the density function should be an
increasing function of  as well. This is why I will use a Logit Density Function
of  as a proxy for the actual Logit Density Function of leisure. Secondly, the
value of exogenous variable should be realistic, but unfortunately it is di¢ cult
to attribute a real value to some parameters such as the preferences of workers
for leisure and the tax allowances should assume values between -1 and 1 which
does not always happen.
4.1 Main Findings
Main results are reported in tables 1-3. Tables 1.a, 2.a and 3.a report the matrix
of inputs, whilst tables 1.b, 2.b and 3.b the matrix of outcomes. Tables 1.a and
1.b refer to period t   1, tables 2.a and 2.b refer to period t and table 3.a and
3.b refer to period t + 1. We may notice some very interesting results. First
of all, tax credits granted to the elder generation are sistematically higher than
those granted to the younger generation. This happens at every period of time.
Secondly, over time, there exists di¤erences in trends amongst generations. In
fact, the trend of the old generation systematically increases over time, whilst
the latter increases only from period t 1 to time t, and it dramatically decreases
from period t to time t + 1. Hence, a rst conclusion may be drawn: at time
when debt is issued, both groups a reduction in the e¤ective marginal tax rate:
the debt acts as a substitute of taxation. Otherwise, at time when the debt is
paid o¤, we realize that the burden is borne only by the younger generation,
whilst the older gets an even greater reduction in the e¤ective marginal tax
rate. Another interesting result refers to the labour supply; we may note that
the elder generation tends to work (rest) less (more) than the younger, with only
one exception at time t + 1 for simulations obtained with a nominal tax rate
equal to 0.3 and 0.6. Nevertheless, notice that tax credits granted to the two
groups are nearly the same. Furthermore, the labour supply increases over the
three periods for both groups. As a consequence, also the total labour supply
increases steadly over time. Tax revenues are always positive for the younger
generation and always negative for the older generation, meaning that the former
is a net taker, whilst the second is a net payer. Notice also that the tax benet
for the older generation tends to increase over time and that tax revenues for
the younger decreases when the debt is issued but dramatically increases once
the debt must be repaid. This again underlies the asymmetry in the allocation
of the burden: the young borne the cost of repayment. The last result refers to
the level of production. For numerical simulations I used a production function
equal to Y = 10
p
L w 1(1  (1  a 1)(t  l 1)+w (1  (1  a)(t  l ),
where L = t  l 1 + t  l . It can be seen that at the period when the debt is
issued the production decreases, whilst it increases at its highest level at time
when the debt is paid o¤.
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5 A model with altruism
I consider now a model where the old workers care of their o¤springs wealth.
A classical altruistic model considers that households can be represented by a
dinasty who is willing to perpetuate forever. As a consequence, the old inter-
nalize the utility function of the young and thus the new utility function of the
old may be written as:
U 1 = c 1t +  
 1 log l 1t + U
 (23)
8    1 2 T   1
where  2 [0; 1] is a parameter which captures the degree of altruism of the
old for the young; the higher  the more the old attach a greater importance to
the youngs wealth. In Appendix 3 i will provide a complete resolution to the
problem.
Proposition 5 The introduction of altruism in the model entails higher tax
credits for the group of the young. The magnitude of this shift is higher, the
higher is .
Proof : see Appendix 2. As we can see by numerical simulation reported in
Appendix 3, the introduction of altruism turns previous results around. This
time the group of the young gain higher tax credits than the group of the old
which is higher the higher is the parameter representing altruism. Furthermore,
the taxation on the old is positive whilst that on the young is negative, meaning
that they get a scal benet whose burden is carried by the old. Nevertheless,
the old still reach higher level of leisure. Results are very easy to interpret: the
higher the old care of the youngs welfare, the higher they are willing to accept
to carry the burden of the social security system. This is a great achievement
for the welfare of society: the old get satisfaction both from leisure and from
being generous, whilst the young get satisfaction by working more and receiving
a scal benet; since Leviathan politicians want to satisfy the electorate, they
are more than happy to set the new pro-younger policy.
6 Conclusions
In this paper I will introduce a new political economy model, where there exists
a competition amongst two political candidates, which aim to set a policy which
enables them to win elections, maximising the probability of winning. I will show
that, if taxes necessary to repay the debt are not lump sum but proportional to
income, we have dramatic distorting e¤ect on the labour supply. The problems
is exacerbate once we take into account that the Government set taxes in order
to favour the most inuencing social group. As a consequence, e¤ective marginal
tax rates are di¤erentiated amongst social groups and thus the burden of public
debt is not equally borne.
12
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8 Appendix 1
In this Appendix I provide a complete resolution to the candidatesproblem. The two can-
didates face exactly the same optimization problem; they maximize their share of votes or,
equivalently, the probability of winning. The resolution is made for candidate A, but it also
holds for candidate B.
max A =
1
2
+
h
s
X
I=fT 1;Tg
nIsI [V i(~qA)  V i(~qB)]
T1  n 2L(t  l 2t )(1  a 2t ) + n 1L(t  l 1t )(1  a 1t ) = 0
at time t  1
T1bis  n 1L(t  l 1t )(1  a 1t ) + n L(t  lt )(1  at ) +Bt = 0
at time t
T1tris  n L(t  lt )(1  at ) + n+1L(t  l+1t )(1  a+1t ) = (1 + r)Bt
at time t+ 1
I write the Lagrangian function for a given budget constraint BC:
` =
1
2
+
h
s
X
I=fT 1;Tg
nIsI [V i(~qA)  V i(~qB)] +  (BC)
I obtain the following rst order conditions which may be seen as a modied version of the
original Lindbeck and Weibull rst order conditions, at time t:
(1) @L
@a 1t
 n 1 @s 1
@l 1t
@l 1t
@a 1t
(V  1A   V  1B) + n 1s 1( @V  1
@a 1t
) = 
@T (1)
@a 1t
(2) @L
@at
 n @s
@lt
@lt
@at
(V A   V B) + n s ( @V 
@at
) = 
@T (1)
@at
(3) BC = 0
According to the result stated in Corollary 1, FOCs can be re-written in the following man-
ner:
(1) @L
@a 1t
 n 1s 1( @V  1
@a 1t
) = 
@T (1)
@a 1t
(2) @L
@at
 n s ( @V 
@at
) = 
@T (1)
@at
(3) BC = 0
and after some easy calculations, I obtain:
(1) n 1s 1(tL+
  1L
(1 (1 a 1t )L)
) ( (1 a
 1
t )
2
L 
 1n 1
(1 (1 a 1t )L)2
) n 1L(t   
 1
(1 (1 a 1t )L)
)) =
0
(2) n s (tL +
  L
(1 (1 at )L)
)  ( (1 a

t )
2
L 
n
(1 (1 at )L)2
  n L(t   

(1 (1 at )L)
)) = 0
(3) BC = 0
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From (1) and (2) obtain:
 =
n 1s 1(t+  
 1
(1 (1 a 1t ))
)
(
(1 a 1t )L  1n 1
(1 (1 a 1t )L)2
)  n 1(t    1
(1 (1 a 1t )L)
))
=
n s (t+  

(1 (1 at ))
)
(
(1 at )L n
(1 (1 at )L)2
  n (t   
(1 (1 at )L)
))
Solving this system of equations analytically is a very di¢ cult task. This is why I per-
formed some numerical simulations instead. In the following tables the main results are
reported.
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Table 1.a - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 - Input
Matrix - Period t-1
n 2 n 1 L t   2   1 s 2 s 1 w ! r B
0:5 0:5 0:3 0:9 0:8 0:2 0:689 0:549 2 1 0:1 0:5
0:5 0:5 0:4 0:9 0:8 0:2 0:689 0:549 2 1 0:1 0:5
0:5 0:5 0:6 0:9 0:8 0:2 0:689 0:549 2 1 0:1 0:5
0:5 0:5 0:4 0:9 0:8 0:2 0:689 0:549 2 1 0:06 0:3
0:5 0:5 0:4 0:9 0:8 0:2 0:689 0:549 2 1 0:14 0:7
Table 1.b - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 -
Output Matrix - Period t-1
a 2t a
 1
t t  l 2t 1 t  l 1t 1 T  2t 1 T  1t 1 Lt 1 Yt 1
1:478 0:169 0:550 0:633  0:078 0:078 1:183 9:146
1:358 0:377 0:550 0:633  0:078 0:078 1:183 9:146
1:239 0:584 0:550 0:633  0:078 0:078 1:183 9:146
1:358 0:377 0:550 0:633  0:078 0:078 1:183 9:146
1:239 0:584 0:550 0:633  0:078 0:078 1:183 9:146
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Table 2.a - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 - Input
Matrix - Period t
n 1 n L t   1   s 1 s w ! r B
0:5 0:5 0:3 0:9 0:8 0:2 0:689 0:549 2 1 0:1 0:5
0:5 0:5 0:4 0:9 0:8 0:2 0:689 0:549 2 1 0:1 0:5
0:5 0:5 0:6 0:9 0:8 0:2 0:689 0:549 2 1 0:1 0:5
0:5 0:5 0:4 0:9 0:8 0:2 0:689 0:549 2 1 0:06 0:3
0:5 0:5 0:4 0:9 0:8 0:2 0:689 0:549 2 1 0:14 0:7
Table 2.b - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 -
Output Matrix - Period t
a 1t at t  l 1t 1 t  lt 1 T  1t 1 T t 1 Lt 1 Yt 1
3:748 0:373 0:68 0:653  0:561 0:061 1:334 8:536
4:924 4:484 0:744 0:816  1:168  0:569 1:560 6:713
2:374 0:686 0:68 0:653  0:561 0:061 1:334 8:536
2:406 0:523 0:643 0:652  0:362 0:062 1:296 8:847
 0:459  1:287 Not Not 0 0 0 0
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Table 3.a - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 - Input
Matrix - Period t+1
n n+1 L t  
  +1 s s+1 w ! r B
0:5 0:5 0:3 0:9 0:8 0:2 0:689 0:549 2 1 0:1 0:5
0:5 0:5 0:4 0:9 0:8 0:2 0:689 0:549 2 1 0:1 0:5
0:5 0:5 0:6 0:9 0:8 0:2 0:689 0:549 2 1 0:1 0:5
0:5 0:5 0:4 0:9 0:8 0:2 0:689 0:549 2 1 0:06 0:3
0:5 0:5 0:4 0:9 0:8 0:2 0:689 0:549 2 1 0:14 0:7
Table 3.b - Main results obtained via numerical simulations with Mathematica 5.2 -
Output Matrix - Period t+1
at a
+1
t t  lt 1 t  l+1t 1 T t 1 T +1t 1 Lt 1 Yt 1
6:426  11:449 0:747 0:9  1:217 1:680 1:647 11:849
5:069  8:337 0:747 0:9  1:217 1:680 1:647 11:849
3:713  5:22 0:747 0:9  1:217 1:680 1:647 11:849
 0:04  0:510 0:212 0:394 0:088 0:119 0:607 7:388
4:508  8:635 0:733 0:9  1:029 1:869 1:703 12:295
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